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We use data from the US airline industry to investigate whether firms that are under
bankruptcy protection, as well as these firm’s product market rivals, change the quality
of the products they offer. We measure the quality of the services offered by a carrier
using flight cancellations and delays, and the age of the aircraft used by the carrier. We
find that delays and cancelations are less frequent during bankruptcy filings but return
to their pre-bankruptcy levels once the bankrupt firm emerges from bankruptcy. We also
find that firms use Chapter 11 filings to permanently reduce the age of their fleet. We
do not find evidence of statistically and economically significant changes by the airline’s
competitors along any of the dimensions above.
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1 Introduction
Partly fueled by the deteriorating credit conditions resulting from the financial turmoil that
began in 2007, corporate bankruptcies in the last few years have soared. The Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts reports 12, 863 Chapter 11 filings for the year ending June 30, 2009,
up about 94 percent from the previous year when 6, 513 business filed for bankruptcy pro-
tection.1 Attention has traditionally centered on the direct costs of bankruptcy proceedings,
such as legal and administrative expenses, as well as their indirect costs, such as lost sales.2
Much of the current discussion involves the effect of bankruptcy on the firm’s employees who
might be laid off, on the firm’s suppliers who might face reduced demand, and on consumers
of the bankrupt firm who face a lower quality product or a reduction in the variety of the
products offered by the bankrupt firm. Still, there is no systematic evidence showing whether
or not product market quality changes during and after bankruptcy 3
We use data from the US airline industry to investigate the effect of Chapter 11 filings
on the quality of the products that firms offer during a bankruptcy filing and after the
firm emerges from bankruptcy protection. Using a single industry allows us to examine
1Firms filing for bankruptcy protection belong to a wide range of industries, from Lehman Brothers to
the Tribune Group in July and December, 2008 respectively, and Chrysler and GM in April and June 2009,
respectively.
2Franks and Torous (1989), Thorburn (2000), Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006), Hennesy and Whited (2007),
Bebchuk (2002)
3For example, there is anecdotal evicence that during financial distress firms lower product quality to
reduce production costs and increase profit margins. A famous case is that of Beech-Nut baby food products.
By 1977, the company was struggling financially . At this point the firm started buying inputs from a new
apple concentrate supplier, Universal Juice Co. This supplier sold its product at up to 25 percent below the
market price. In 1979.the firm was bought by Nestle. By mid 1980, concerns were raised by research scientists
suggesting that the apple juice concentrate supplied by Universal Juice Co. was adulterated. However, the
new management dismissed those concerns and continued buying from Universal Juice Co. The FDA begun
an investigation which revealed that the product that Beech-Nut was then marketing as 100 percent apple
juice was actually made from beet sugar, cane sugar syrup, corn syrup and other ingredients, with little if
any apple juice in the mixture. In November 1986, a federal grand jury indicted Beech-Nut and its top two
executives. Prosecutors claimed that the bogus apple juice cost about 20 percent less to make than real
apple juice. See The New York Times, November 14, 1987 and New York Times, October 31, 1993. For
a brief history of Beech-Nut, see http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/BeechNut-Nutrition-
Corporation-Company-History.html
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how bankruptcy filings affect the quality of the products while abstracting from potentially
confounding unobserved differences across different industries. Thus, our analysis is in the
same spirit as Chevalier (1995), who studies the relationship between leverage buyouts and
the pricing behavior of firms and their rivals using cross-section data from the US supermarket
industry.
Several features of the airline industry make it particularly appealing to address the ques-
tion of this paper. First, and foremost, there are clear and objective ways to define measures
of product quality: flight cancellations, flight delays, and aircraft age, as well as oversold
seats, and lost and mishandled bagagge4. Second, there have been several bankruptcy filings
in the industry over the last ten years by firms that interact with different carriers in dis-
tinct markets, and over different years. This allows us to identify the effects of bankruptcy
on product quality, independent of potentially confounding market, firm, and time effects.
Finally, the airline industry is an oligopoly, and hence we should expect competitors to react
strategically to the choices made by bankrupt firms in the markets where these firms interact.
Competitors might attempt to displace the bankrupt firm and capture the distressed firm’s
market share by improving product quality. However, non-bankrupt firms do not enjoy the
concessions that bankruptcy grants the insolvent firm, for example, in terms of lease and la-
bor contract renegotiations and rejections. Thus, these firms are limited in the way in which
they can reorganize their business plan to respond to changes adopted by the bankrupt firm.
A non trivial part of restructuring is changing the real day-to-day operations. This in
turn, has implications for the product market where the firm works. Product market effects
include two distinct but related issues. First, does the bankrupt firm alter the quality of
the products it offers during and after emerging from bankruptcy? Product quality is an
4We also considered baggage lost, mishandled, and/or pilfered, and oversold seats, as measures of an airline’s
quality of service. However, for these measures, the data available from the data is not market specific, but
only carrier and year-quarter (or year-month) specific. Since the variation across markets is lost, it is not
possible to identify the effect of oversales or lost baggages from confounding market effects (e.g., luggages are
more likely to be lost in smaller/larger markets, etc).
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implicit contract between customers and the firm (Maksimovic and Titman (1991)), and it is
one suceptible to unilateral change by the insolvent firm, as it might lower quality to reduce
costs and hence increase revenue. A second related question is whether the distressed firm
will change the quantity and variety of products offered: Which operations and products will
the firm continue to offer and which ones will it shed? Consistent with this quantity choice,
at what price will the firm sell these products? In bankruptcy the insolvent firm can reject
leases and labor contracts, granting the firm a larger leeway to modify its price and quantity
business strategy, by shedding products and reducing services. This is the price and quantity
question.
In this paper, we concentrate exclusively on the first question: The effects of bankruptcy
on product market quality, as captured by flight cancellations, arrival delays, and age of
aircrafts. We further discuss and present some evidence using baggage lost and oversold
seats in a flight. Ours is the first paper to address the product-market quality implications
of bankruptcy. In a companion paper, we focus exclusively on the second question and study
the effects of bankruptcy filings on airline network structure, capacity choices, and ticket
prices. And report that bankrupt airlines downsize their national route structure as well as
their airport-specific networks; and that bankrupt airlines reduce their route-specific flight
frequency and capacity. Consistently, prices are not significantly lower after bankruptcy.
When dealing with quality changes, in particular arrival delays and flight cancellations, we
control for the number of departed flights within markets and time period, since, as our
companion paper shows, capacity shrinks during bankruptcy and this could impact delays
and cancelations.
We akcnowledge that changes in product market competition (both price-quantity and
quality) might pre-date the actual filing, creating a potential endogeneity concern. As will
be nade clear in the econometric section, we deal with this following Ashenfelter (1978).
We find that an insolvent firm decreases the percent of cancelled flights by 8 percent while it
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operates under protection, and increases it by 3 percent after emerging from bankruptcy, both
numbers relative to pre-bankruptcy levels. The percentage of flights with at least a 15 minute
delay upon arrival drops by 9 percent while the carrier operates under bankruptcy protection,
but returns to the pre-bankruptcy levels once the carrier emerges from bankruptcy. The age
of the fleet (in years since delivery of the make/model), flown by the insolvent firm, drops
9 percent while the carrier operates under protection, and remains lower after the carrier
emerges from protection. Overall, these results show that a firm operating in bankruptcy
might be able to improve the quality of its services only temporarily and while the firm
operates under bankruptcy. Once the firm emerges, the quality of daily operations return
to their pre-bankruptcy levels. The only change that appears permanent concerns the one
stemming from an investment in fixed assets, the renovation of the fleet.
Our results are related to those in a companion paper (Ciliberto and Schenone [2011]).
There we use asimilar econometric methodology to then one employed in this paper, but we
address a different question, we employ a different dataset, and shed light into a to study the
effects of bankruptcy filings on airline network structure, capacity choices, and ticket prices.
We find that bankrupt airlines downsize their national route structure as well as their airport-
specific networks; and that bankrupt airlines reduce their route-specific flight frequency and
capacity. We also find, somewhat surprisingly, that prices are higher after bankruptcy.
The analysis in this paper differs from the one in Ciliberto and Schenone [2011] because
here we focus on the extent to which bankruptcy filings are associated with changes in the
vertical differentiation of the airline services among firms rather than with changes in capacity
and price choices. Such a clear distinction between price and quality competition is common
in corporate finance and industrial organization because modeling simultaneously price and
quality competition is theoretically very complex.5 There is an additional, practical, reason
why we focus on quality competition in this paper: It is extremely rare to be able to observe
5For example, see Tirole [1988].
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measures of quality, which instead we do in the airline industry. This combination of factors
explains why our analysis is the first one in the literature that investigates the effect of
bankruptcy filings on product quality.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives an overview on the literature on
financial distress and bankruptcy and product market competition. In Section 3 we describes
specific features of the U.S. bankruptcy code that have the potential to affect product quality,
and we specifically mention two sections of the Code that pertain to the airline industry.
Section 4 describes the data, how we measure different dimensions of product quality, and
defines the key variables in the analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical specification and
Section 6 discusses the results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
There is a vast theoretical literature on the interaction between capital structure and product
market competition.6 The empirical literature has validated this link with evidence on the
interaction between leverage decisions and product market prices (Chevalier, 1995a, 1995b;
Phillips, 1995; Dasgputa and Titman (1998); Pichler, Stomper, and Zulehner, 2008); be-
tween investment behavior and financial distress (Bhagat, Moyen, and Suh, 2005); between
bankruptcy and product prices (Borenstein and Rose, 1995, and Ciliberto and Schenone,
2011); and between the announcements of bankruptcy filings and stock market performance
(Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhija, 1997). Interest has extended beyond product market prices
and has focused on how capital structure choices impact corporate performance as measured
by sales (John, Lang, and Netter, 1992; Opler and Titman, 1994; Hotchkiss, 1995; Campello,
2003, 2006), and on the interaction between capital structure and the firm’s decision to enter
and exit a specific product market (John, Lang, and Netter, 1992; Kovenock and Phillips,
1995, 1997).
6See for instance, Titman (1984), Brander and Lewis (1986), Benoit (1986), Maksimovic (1988), Chevalier
and Scharfstein (1995), and Dasgputa and Titman (1998).
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The theoretical literature has advanced and delved into the interaction between product
market quality and capital structure. The first paper in this area is that of Titman (1984).
In this work, individuals are reluctant to buy from firms that might go bankrupt because
customers face a cost when the firm goes out of business. Maksimovic and Titman (1991)
develop this idea further in a model where customers, even if they do not face a cost when the
firm goes bankrupt, might still be averse to doing business with a highly levered firm because
the financial difficulties that could arise from high leverage have detrimental effects on the
firm’s incentive to honor its implicit contracts. One such contract is the firm’s agreement to
supply high-quality products. These two papers established a potential practical link between
the firm’s leverage and the quality of the products or services that the firm’s customers receive.
The empirical literature has yet to determine whether there is in fact an observed relation-
ship between a firm’s capital structure and the quality of its products. This paper contributes
to filling this gap, by exploring the effects of a firm’s bankruptcy filing on the quality of the
products and services that it provides. Specifically, we disentangle the effect on the quality
and variety of the products provided by a bankrupt firm and its competitors, both during
and after bankruptcy.
Exploring the actual link between bankruptcy and product quality unveils a real cost of
bankruptcy to the customers of the insolvent firm which has so far remained vastly unexplored
in the financial literature. Analysis of the costs of bankruptcy has focused on the direct and
indirect costs.7 Direct costs include bankruptcy proceeding fees, such as court and lawyer
expenses, as well as fees paid to accountants and expert witnesses. Indirect costs include the
change in the value of the estate during the bankruptcy process, as well as the time the firm
spends under bankruptcy protection. The latter has been used to proxy for a bankruptcy’s
adverse impact on product markets as well as the capital markets (Franks and Torous, 1989,
and Thorburn, 2000). As Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006) claim, this is a very noisy proxy for
7Recently, there has been extended research comparing auctions against a reorganization-based bankruptcy
system such as Chapter 11. See Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 2003, and Eckbo and Thorburn, 2009.
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the indirect costs of bankruptcy, adding to the controversy over the magnitude of indirect
bankruptcy costs. By precisely measuring the effects of bankruptcy on product market quality,
we can cleanly measure one way in which a firm’s insolvency can have an adverse effect on
the firm’s customers, thus allowing us to precisely measure a bankruptcy’s adverse impact
on the product market.
3 Bankruptcy in the Airline Industry
The United States Bankruptcy Code contemplates two alternative solutions for firms that are
in financial distress and are filing for court protection: Chapter 7 (Liquidation) and Chapter
11 (Reorganization). Chapter 7 allows for an orderly, court-supervised procedure by which
a trustee collects the assets of the firm, reduces them to cash, and makes distributions to
creditors subject to the debtor’s right to retain certain exempt property and to the rights
of secured creditors. Chapter 11 allows the bankrupt firm to continue operating while the
firm’s management restructures its business. We focus on Chapter 11 filings and drop firms
filing under Chapter 7 because we are interested in the changes in the variety and quality of
the services provided by a firm that operates under bankruptcy protection, and firms filing
for Chapter 7 cease operations and liquidate their assets.8
A firm operating under bankruptcy protection can benefit from provisions granted by
the United States Bankruptcy Law, such as creditor protection and greater flexibility to
renegotiate and rescind contracts. For instance, under Section 1113 of Chapter 11, an airline
can unilaterally modify labor agreements if negotiations with employees and labor unions
are unsuccessful, and can terminate labor contracts it deems no longer needed. And under
Section 1110 of Chapter 11, the bankrupt firm can selectively reject leases on aircrafts and
freely return unwanted and outdated aircrafts to the lessor. These concessions allow the firm
8For a more detailed description of the institutional details associated with bankruptcy filings in the airline
industry, see Ciliberto and Schenone (2010) and references therein.
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to downsize, reduce capacity, and reduce the variety of products offered shifting from the
least profitable ones to the most profitable ones, at a lower cost than what would have to be
borne outside of bankruptcy. As a consequence of this, the firm frees funds that might be
reallocated to improving the quality of the products that the firm continues to offer.
Rescinding leases. Rejecting leases on selected aircrafts frees up funds that allow the
carrier to reorganize its fleet and to replace older aircrafts with newer, more comfortable, and
higher quality ones. Rescinding leases on airport facilities, such as gates and hangars, can
also free up funds so that the carrier can acquire ‘better’ gates that increase the efficiency
with which the carrier can turn around the plane for the next flight, and lowering departure
and arrival delays. In sum, rejecting leases on aircrafts and gates lowers the cost of reducing
service (frequency and markets served), but can allow an increase in the quality of the services
that the carrier still provides.
Rescinding labor contracts. Rejecting labor contracts can have an ambiguous effect on
the quality of services. If layoffs result in a smaller workforce than needed to efficiently
perform the daily operations of the firm, the carrier’s quality of service drops. But if layoffs
allow the firm to replace entrenched and inefficient personnel with a more efficient workforce,
service quality increases. For instance, laying off necessary gate agents and aircraft cleaning
crews can delay the process of boarding a flight, thus resulting in longer departure and arrival
delays for the late-in-boarding flight as well as for the flight that is incoming to that gate.
On the other hand, if the laid-off gate agents were unnecessary for the firm’s operations, or
were entrenched and inefficient employees that can now be replaced with more efficient ones,
then there might be some improvement (or no effect) in product quality.
4 Data Description
Our data is an original compilation from several sources. From the Air Transportation Asso-
ciation Web site, Lynn LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Database, and Factiva and Lexis-Nexis reports,
9
we obtain the identity of carriers filing for bankruptcy, the dates on which each carrier en-
tered and exited court protection, and the specific way in which each carrier emerged from
protection.9 We merge this dataset with the data on product quality gathered from several
original sources: The “On-Time Performance Schedule” gathered by the Bureau of Trans-
portation Statistics (BTS); the T-100 Domestic Segment of Form 41 reported by the BTS; the
Web sites of aircraft producers (e.g., Boeing or Airbus);“The International Directory of Civil
Aircraft”; and the “Aviation Consumer Protection Division” (ACPD) of the Department of
Transportation (DOT). Table 1 describes the data sources, the units of observation, and
other characteristics in each dataset. Table 2 provides summary statistics.
Carrier Definition. We consider nine national carriers operating between 1997 and 2007:
American, Continental, Delta, America West (until the third quarter of 2005), Northwest,
TWA (until the second quarter of 2001), United, US Airways, and Southwest. We also
consider two low-cost carriers that had a strong presence during this period, Airtran and
ATA. We group the remaining low cost carriers into one category, LCC. The carriers in this
category are: Aloha Airlines, Alaska Airlines, Jet Blue, Independence Air, Frontier Airlines,
Florida Airlines, and YZ: LCC = {AQ, AS, B6, DH, F9, FL, Y V }. For each route-year-
quarter, we take the averages across the low-cost carriers for the control variables. Grouping
low-cost carriers in one category allows us to keep small carriers that are present in only a
few markets or for a few quarters when we include route-carrier fixed effects. Furthermore,
it allows us to use a meaningful grouping, capturing the impact of small carriers’ presence in
the market.
Route Definition. We define a route, denoted by r, as a non-stop airport-to-airport trip.
9The Bankruptcy Resrearch Database compiled by Law Professor Lynn LoPucki includes all Chapter 11
bankruptcy cases that satisfy the following two requirements. First, the debtor group filing for Chapter 11
protection must have assets worth at least $100 million at the time of filing (measured in 1980 dollars), as
listed in the last 10-K filed before bankruptcy (provided that the 10-K is for a year ending within three years
prior to filing for bankruptcy). Second, the debtor group is required to file 10-Ks with the SEC. For airlines
satisfying these requirements, we double check the filing dates, the type of filing, and the date of emergence
where available.
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We consider all airport-to-airport pairs between the top 50 Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSAs), ranked by population size. Here a route is also a market, and we refer to them
interchangeably.
Bankrupt Carriers.We identify airlines that have filed for bankruptcy protection between
1997 and 2007 from the Air Transportation Association Website, which provides a list of the
names of air carriers that have filed for bankruptcy protection, the date of the bankruptcy
filing, and the type of protection requested by the airline (Chapter 11 or Chapter 7). We
cross check this data with the Bankruptcy Research Database, compiled by Lynn LoPucki.
There are six carriers operating under bankruptcy protection during our sample period:
United Airlines (December 9, 2002 through February 2, 2006), US Airways (August 11, 2002
through March 31, 2003 and then again September 12, 2004 through September 27, 2005),
ATA (October 26, 2004 through February 28, 2006), Delta (September 14, 2005 through
May 1, 2007), and Northwest (September 14, 2005 through May 31, 2007). Some small
carriers operated under court protection for a small time window, and thus we cannot consider
these carriers independently (E.g., Independence Air operated under court protection between
November 7, 2005 and January 5, 2006).10
Unit of Observation. The unit of observation is a carrier-route-year-quarter. We denote
time periods by t = 1, ...T . For example, the combination jrt indicates that airline j (e.g.
American) transports its passengers on route r (Chicago O’Hare to Fort Lauderdale Airport)
at time t (e.g. the second quarter of 2002). Note that an important reason for using the airline
industry for our analysis is that airlines compete over many different routes and markets, and
over different time periods. Furthermore, a carrier’s competitors at any given point in time,
in one route, might not be the same competitors in a different route at that same time. For
10We exclude TWA’s third bankruptcy even though it occured during our sample period because the firm
stayed under bankruptcy protection for less than one quarter. Furthermore, because we include route-carrier
and year-quarter fixed effects, this bankruptcy would be dropped in the econometric analysis. For an analysis
of prepackaged bankruptcies, see Carapeto, 2005.
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example, United Airline’s competitors in Denver-San Francisco in the first quarter of 2001 are
not the same set of competitors United faces in the route between Dallas Forth Worth and
Newark in the first quarter of 2001. Thus, a carrier’s business strategy in one route might
differ from its strategy on a different route. Therefore, even though we have six different
bankrupt carriers in the national domestic market, the strategic decision a carrier makes
in one route can differ from the one taken in a different route. This allows us to span the
effective number of firms (bankrupt and not bankrupt).11
4.1 Bankruptcy Categorical Variables
Several factors that can alter the competitive interaction between firms in an industry come
into play when one of the firms in the industry reorganizes under Chapter 11. First, the
bankrupt firm faces cost shocks inherent to operating under court protection, such as the
ability to renege and renegotiate contracts. At the same time, the bankrupt firm faces
demand shocks stemming from loss of consumer confidence, which reduce demand for its
products (Opler and Titman, 1994).
We cannot capture cost related shocks using accounting data on costs because these report
exactly those liabilities which are renegotiated under bankruptcy, and hence do not reveal
exogenous cost shocks. Demand shocks are not observable. Therefore, to capture all of these
changes we use bankruptcy categorical variables. Below we summarize the information used
to derive and construct these categorical variables.
We define the set K of carriers that filed for bankruptcy protection at some point between
1997 and 2007 as K =
{
UA,US(1st), US(2nd), NW,DL, TZ
}
. Notice that US Airways filed
for Chapter 11 twice.12 In the rest of the paper, we will use the subscript k = 1, ...,K to
11In fact, the literature on the airline industry (see for example, Berry (1990), Borenstein (1989), Brueckner,
Dyer and Spiller (1992), Berry and Jia (2010), and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009)) assumes that carriers make
decisions that are route specific as opposed to making nation wide decisions.
12During our analysis period, TWA filed for bankruptcy for the third time. This filing lasted for less than
one quarter. Because of its brevity and because we include route-carrier and year-quarter fixed effects, we do
not include it in the analysis.
12
denote a bankrupt firm (where K is equal to 6). Next, we discuss the variables that measure
the effect of bankruptcy protection during and after the time when the firm is under Chapter
11.
During the Bankruptcy Filing. We want to distinguish the effect that bankruptcy filings
have on the quality measures we consider, for the bankrupt firm, and for its competitors,
during the time when the bankrupt firm operates under Chapter 11, as well as after the firm
emerges from bankruptcy protection. To measure these effects, we construct the following
categorical variables. First, we define Bktrt equal to 1 if there is at least one carrier under
bankruptcy protection at time t and that carrier provides service on route r, otherwise, Bktrt
is equal to zero. For each quality measure, we study the average effect of bankruptcy across
markets and across bankrupt and non-bankrupt carriers.
After the Emergence from Bankruptcy. Next, we ask whether any observed price
changes during bankruptcy persist once the bankrupt firm emerges from court protection.
To do this, we define the categorical variable AftBktrt equal to 1 if there is at least one
carrier that was under bankruptcy protection at a time before t, and that carrier currently
serves route r. Otherwise, AftBktrt is equal to zero.
Active Firm Categorical Variables. The presence of a bankrupt carrier in a route could
affect the behavior of all other carriers in that market, regardless of whether or not that
carrier is under Chapter 11 protection. Without controlling for the presence of a carrier
that is bankrupt at some point in time, we cannot identify the effect of a firm k’s filing for
bankruptcy protection separately from the average effect of that carrier k’s presence. We
address this problem with categorical variables that capture whether a bankrupt or a to-be-
bankrupt firm is in the market: Inrt is equal to 1 if at least one bankrupt firm k is present
in route r at time t.
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4.2 Quality of Products
In this paper we consider three measures that identify quality of airline service: Arrival
delays, flight cancellations, and aircraft age13. There are other measures of airline quality of
service, such as lost, pilfered and mishandled baggages and oversold flights, that we do not
employ in the econometric analysis, since this data is carrier-year-quarter specific and lacks
the market dimension. Such lack of market specific variation reduces the identification power
of econometric estimates. This will be discussed in further detail following the discussion on
the results we obtain for delays, flight cancellations, and aircraft age.
Flight delays We begin our study with an analysis of flight delays14. Data on flight delays
are from the “On-Time Performance” schedule gathered by the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics (BTS). Delays correspond to delays for reasons within the carrier’s control, as
well as those beyond its control. If one thought that any effect on delays observed during
bankruptcy is related to reasons beyond the carrier’s control, such as weather delays, then the
distribution of bad weather in a market over time has to coincide with the times when there
is a bankrupt carrier operating in that market (this is, weather should always be worse for
flying during the times when some carrier is bankrupt). And this is highly unlikely.15 Arrival
delays are calculated as the difference between the scheduled and the actual arrival times.
Delayjrt measures for every carrier j, flying route r, during year-quarter t, the number of
13There is a rich literature that studies the quality of airline service. Work by Headly and Bowen (1997),
Gourdin (1988), and Elliott and Roach (1993) considered as measures of airline service quality the average age
of the fleet, the number of aircrafts, the percent of delayed arrivals and departures, the number of cancelled
and diverted flights.
14Previous works have looked at the relationship between flight delays and the following variables: competi-
tion (Rupp, D. Owens and L. Plumly, 2006), market concentration (Mazzeo, 2003), aircraft capacity utilization
(Ramdas and Williams, 2011), airport congestion (Mayer and Sinai, 2003), stock price movements (Li, Lipson,
Ramdas, and Williams, 2011).
15Data on delays that are within the carrier’s control is available only after June 2003. This restricts the
sample period and excludes the first bankruptcy filing by US Airways, as well as the beginning of United
Airlines’ bankruptcy. We estimate regressions using both measures of delays and, not surprisingly, find that
the results are statistically and economically similar.
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times that the carrier’s flights are at least 15 minutes late upon arrival.16 Table 2 shows
that on average, across markets and carriers, there are 58 flights per quarter that are at least
15 minutes late. Note that there are on average, across carriers and markets, 337 flights
scheduled and 292 flight departures, in a quarter.17
Flight cancellations Next, we consider flight cancellations as measure of quality of service.
Data on cancelled flights are from the “On-Time Performance” schedule. Cancelledjrt is the
total number of times that carrier j cancelled a flight on route r during the year-quarter t.18 A
flight is considered cancelled by the BTS when it is listed in a carrier’s computer reservation
system during the seven calendar days prior to its scheduled departure but the flight was
not operated and did not depart.19 Table 2 shows that on average there are 8.377 flights
per quarter that are canceled. Notice that 23.32 percent of the route-carrier-year-quarter
observations do not have even one flight that was canceled. In this case, there is reason to
be worried about any bias induced by left-censoring. We will show results when we run a
random effect tobit regressions and compare them with the results when we run a standard
linear random effects regression. The results are identical, suggesting that in practice, left
censoring is not an issue for the analysis of this variable.20
Aircraft age The age of a specific aircraft, the overall condition of its cabin, and its safety
record is another measure of the quality of airline service. Older planes have been reported
to be less comfortable in terms of space, noise emission, cabin pressure, and entertainment
16We only look at route-carrier-year-quarter observations for which we know that a carrier had at least 50
departed flights. This means that a carrier had to serve a route at least for a month and a half with at least
one flight per day.
17We do not have reasons to worry about any bias induced by left-censoring, since only 0.17 percent of the
route-carrier-year-quarter observations do not have even one flight that was delayed at least 15 minutes (the
number of zeros in the variable Delayjrt over the total number of observations in a route, by a carrier, in a
year quarter is 0.17).
18For a study on the determinants of flight cancelations, see Holmes and Rupp, 2006.
19We only look at route-carrier-year-quarter observations for which we know that a carrier had at least 50
scheduled flights. This means that a carrier had to have a scheduled flight in a route at least for a month
and a half with at least one flight per day.
20Table 4, columns 11 and 12.
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opportunities.21 We use the T-100 Domestic Segment Database of Form 41 reported by the
BTS to collect data on the specific aircraft type, make, and model that is flown by carrier
j on route r during year-quarter t. We gather the date when each specific aircraft type was
first delivered by the producer using data from the aircraft producer’s Web site. Missing data
in the aircraft producers Web site is completed using “The International Directory of Civil
Aircraft.”22 We compute the time span between the year when an aircraft of a particular
make and model was used on route r by carrier j, and the year when that particular aircraft
make and model was first delivered for commercial flight. We denote this variable with
AgeAircraftjrt.
23 Table 2 shows that on average planes are 20.46 years old. Notice that
only 0.03 percent of the route-carrier-year-quarter observations have a plane that is less than
one year old, so there is no reason to be worried about any bias induced by left-censoring.
5 Empirical Specification
We estimate regressions of these measures of variety and quality of service on two sets of
bankruptcy related categorical variables. The first indicates whether a competitor in a market
currently operates under bankruptcy protection (BktOwnrt for the effect of the bankrupt firm,
and BktOthersrt for the effect on competitors). The second indicates whether any of the firms
competing in a market previously operated under bankruptcy (AftBktOwnrt for the effect of
the ex-bankrupt firm, and AftBktOthersrt for the effect of the competitors of the ex-bankrupt
firm). The latter allows us to distinguish whether the effects of bankruptcy on the variety
and quality of an airline’s service are temporary or whether they persist after the insolvent
firm exits bankruptcy. All of our specifications control for heterogeneity across carriers and
airline routes with route-carrier fixed effects. To control for possible time shocks, we include
21For example, in Jet Blue’s fleet of Embraers each seat is equipped with a monitor where passengers can
watch popular TV shows and live news updates.
22In very few cases we used information from www.airliners.net.
23Occasionally, carrier j flying route r during year-quarter t uses more than one aircraft type. In these
cases, we choose the oldest plane.
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year-quarter dummies.
We develop a simple econometric specification that captures the in-bankruptcy and post-
bankruptcy effects of a firm’s Chapter 11 filing on the quality of the products offered by the






where εjrt is the remaining component of the regression to be discussed in detail below.
Here, Qjrt is one of the measures discussed in Section (4.2): Delayjrt , Cancelledjrt, and
AgeAircraftjrt. The coefficient α
OWN measures the current effect of a bankruptcy filing on
the bankrupt firm’s variable Qjgt, while α
OTH measures the current effect on the bankrupt’s
firm competitors. The post-bankruptcy effects are measured by βOWN and βOTHER, for the
bankrupt firm and its competitors, respectively.
Let εjgt be defined as follows:
εjrt = γInrt + θo(r)Originrt · Trendt + θd(r)Destrt · Trendt + ujr + ut + ujrt (2)
The first component of εjgt is the variable that controls for whether one of the firms
that is filing for bankruptcy operates in route r at any point in time, Inrt. It is likely that
this variable is a function of the same unobservable that affect the carrier’s quality choices,
introducing sample selection concerns. Route-carrier fixed effects, ujr, control for this type
of selection (Veerbek and Nijman [1992]). Route-carrier fixed effects also control for route-
carrier sources of heterogeneity. The idiosyncractic carrier-route-year-quarter unobservable
is captured by ujrt. The term ut represent year-quarter fixed effects that capture quality
changes triggered by demand changes stemming from seasonal (or other exogenous time
varying) shocks, such as weather variation, high/low travel season, increases in the cost of
fuel. This also capture any serially correlated industry-specific shock to demand. Finally, we
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account for the possibility of persistent correlation between negative unobserved current and
expected demand shifts (that extend beyond the pre-bankruptcy period which we eliminate)
in markets served by the bankrupt airlines relative to that found in markets served by other
airlines. To deal with such market-specific unobservable correlations across time, we follow
Friedberg (1998), and include linear market time trends. The variable Trendt is a time trend.
Finally, θo(r) is the parameter of the origin-specific time trend, where o is the origin airport
of route r. Similarly, θd(r) is the parameter of the destination-specific time trend.
In the time period immediately proceeding the bankruptcy filing, the insolvent firm might
take actions to avoid bankruptcy that it would not otherwise take. One such action could be
to attempt to increase profit margins by reducing the quality of the products offered (under
the assumption that lower quality products can be produced at a lower price). If this where
the case, the bankruptcy indicator variables in our quality equations would be endogenous.24
To deal with such unobservable that are correlated with pre-bankruptcy quality and with
the firm’s bankruptcy filing, we follow the strategy used by Ashenfelter [1978]. In this work,
Ashenfelter noted that all trainees suffered unexpected earning declines in the year prior to
entering a training program (see Ashenfelter (1978, page 51)). Therefore simple comparisons
of earnings before and after the training program would be misleading evidence of the effect
of training on earnings. To deal with this, Ashenfelter dropped the period immediately
preceding training (see Ashenfelter (1978, page 53)). In our case, a comparison of pre- and
post- bankruptcy quality levels would yield a dampened effect of bankruptcy on product
quality. We follow Ashenfelter’s strategy and exclude the 2 quarters preceding bankruptcy.
In related work, Ciliberto and Schenone (2011) show that during bankruptcy, the dis-
tressed carrier’s lower capacity, and reduce the number of national routes served, the airport-
specific route network (i.e., the number of flights served out of an airport), as well as lowering
24Recall the example of Beech-Nut during the mid 1980s. The firm was struggling financially, and to keep
the firm from insolvency, management decided to knowingly continue buying adulterated juice from Universal
Juice Co. since this was 20% less expensive than real apple juice.
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the frequency of flights in a given route (the number of flights offered in a given route during
a year-quarter). Such downsizing can affect the carrier’s ontime performance and its cancel-
lation policy: With fewer flights serving a market, it might be easier to reduce arrival delays
and canceling flights might be a less attractive option. Therefore, if we observed fewer arrival
delays and fewer cancellations, this could be not due to an improvement in quality per se,
but to a lower frequency of flights and a reduced capacity. To disentangle this capacity effect
from the bankruptcy effect, we include the log of the number of departed flights by carrier j,
in route r, at time t, Log(Departed F lightsjrt) and the log of the number of cancellations.
If there is a change in arrival delays (or in cancellations) due to the reduced service provided
by the carrier, then these variables will capture this effect and the bankruptcy variables will
be clean of the reduced service effect.
In order to interpret the coefficients of the dummy variables in the semilogarithmic re-
gression equation above we need to transform the estimates. This is because in a semilog
regression the coefficient of a dummy variable, multiplied by 100, is not equal to the percent-
age effect of that variable on the variable being explained. Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980)
show that to give the estimated coefficient a percentage interpretation, we need to transform
the coefficient as follows. If the estimated coefficient is αˆOWN then the percentage effect of
BktOwnrt on Qjrt is α˜
OWN = exp(αˆOWN)− 1.
6 Results
Here we discuss the results concerning the effect of bankruptcy on the quality of the products
that the firm offers.
Arrival Delays. In Table 3, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of arrival
delays of at least 15 minutes. Note that in all of these regressions we also include the natural
logarithm of the number of departed flights, Log(Departed F lightsjrt). Note these are not
scheduled flights, but the actual number of flights flown by carrier j, in route r, during year-
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quarter t. This variable will absorb any effect on arrival delays that might arise from a change
in carrier j’s capacity, thus disentangling the effect on delays of capacity reduction from the
effect of change in the bankrupt firm’s operations.
Columns 1 and 2 report that the percentage of flights arriving at least 15 minutes late
for the bankrupt carrier falls by 9 percent while the firm operates under court protection,
but returns to its pre-bankruptcy level after the firm emerges from protection. Competitors,
instead, do not exhibit any change in the percentage of such arrival delays, although upon the
bankrupt firm’s emergence from protection their arrival delays increase by about 4 percent.
These results are obtained when excluding the 2 quarters prior to bankruptcy, and including
route-carrier fixed effects, year-quarter fixed effects, and origin and destination time trends.
Comparing these results with those in Columns 3 through 10 reveals the importance of
controlling for these unobservables. Specifically, when we exclude year-quarter fixed effects
(Columns 3 through 10) we find that the percentage of arrival delays longer than 15 minutes
increases rather than decreases both during and after bankruptcy, and for both the insolvent
firm and its competitors. This indicates that arrival delays have changed over time, and
therefore ignoring these time effects results in biased estimates that confound the effect of
bankruptcy on arrival delays.
In Columns 5 and 6 we exclude the origin and destination time trends, and find that
these controls are important for identifying the effect of bankruptcy on delays. Columns 7
and 8 add back the 2 quarters prior to bankruptcy. Comparing the results in Columns 5
and 6 with those in 7 and 8, we find that excluding the quarters before bankruptcy does not
significantly affect the results, thus suggesting that the bankruptcy categorical variables are
not endogenous in the regression on arrival delays. Finally, Columns 9 and 10 also drop
the route-carrier fixed effect and the results are similar to those in Columns 7 and 8.
The estimated coefficient for Log(Departed F lightsjrt) shown in Columns 1 through 10
ranges from 1.04 to 1.09, implying that a 10 percent decrease in the number of performed
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arrivals decreases by approximately 10 percent the number of flights arriving at least 15
minutes late.
Cancelled Flights. Next, we focus on flight cancellations as a measure of air travel quality.
In Table 4, the dependent variable for equation (1) is the natural logarithm of cancelled
flights by carrier j, in a market r, in a particular year quarter t. Again, note that in all of these
regressions, we add Log(Scheduled F lightsjrt), the log of the number of scheduled flights by
carrier j, in route r, during year-quarter t. The purpose of this control is to capture any
effect that fewer flights by carrier j, in route r, at time t can have on the number of cancelled
flights by that carrier, in that route, at that time, and hence the effect of bankruptcy on
cancellations is clean from any confounding effect that the downsizing which occurs during
bankruptcy can have on flight cancellations..
Columns 1 and 2 show that during a carrier’s bankruptcy, the insolvent firm drops
the number of cancelled flights by 8 percent relative to the number of cancellations pre-
bankruptcy. After emerging from bankruptcy protection, cancellations by the previously
insolvent carrier increase by 3 percent relative to pre-bankruptcy. The number of cancellations
by the non-bankrupt carriers in competition with the bankrupt carrier fall by 4 percent while
the insolvent firm operates under protection, but return to the pre-bankruptcy level after
the competitor emerges from protection. The positive effect of bankruptcy on the number of
flight cancellations does not outlive the firm’s bankruptcy, and both the insolvent firm and
its competitors return to pre-bankruptcy levels or higher.
Results reported in Columns 3 and 4 are obtained excluding year-quarter fixed effects.
The in-bankruptcy results are larger in magnitude but they are in the same direction for
both the bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms (drop in cancellations); but the post-bankruptcy
results are in the opposite direction (decrease in cancellations). Comparing the results in
Columns 1 and 2 with those in 3 and 4 reveals that there are time-specific unobservable
effects that, if uncontrolled, can confound the identification of the effect of bankruptcy on
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cancelled flights.
Columns 5 and 6 further exclude the origin and destination time trends that capture any
persistent correlation of cancellations over time within a market. The results are in the same
direction as in Columns 3 and 4 but much larger in magnitude, suggesting that there are
indeed origin and destination specific effects that are correlated over time and which can
confound the effect of bankruptcy (e.g., an airport located in a city that is in persistent
economic decline can become more inefficient, leading to a greater number of cancellations
out of that origin airport, regardless of the carrier’s bankruptcy status).
Columns 7 and 8 include the 2 quarters prior to bankruptcy. The results are marginally
smaller in magnitude though in the same direction as in Columns 5 and 6. We therefore
conclude that bankruptcy might not be endogenous to flight cancellations. Columns 9 and
10 further exclude route-carrier fixed effects, and we obtain similar results. Columns 11 and
12 also include random effects but now we run a tobit regression, allowing for left censoring
at 0. Remarkably, the results are identical to those in Columns 9 and 10, suggesting that
left censoring does not introduce a bias in our estimation.
We find that the coefficient on Log(Scheduled F lightsjrt) ranges from 0.89 to 0.92, sug-
gesting that a 10 percent decline in flights is correlated with a 9 percent decline in cancella-
tions.
Aircraft Age. The age of the aircraft can impact the traveler’s comfort (and possibly
safety) during the flight. The bankrupt carrier’s ability to selectively renege on aircraft
leases while operating under bankruptcy court protection allows it to rescind leases on older,
more inefficient, and uncomfortable airplanes in favor of newer, more efficient, and more
comfortable ones. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence of bankrupt carrier’s reneging their
lease agreements on aircrafts. For instance, during US Airway’s bankruptcy filing in 2002, a
U.S. bankruptcy-court judge gave US Airways relief from making any payments on 57 aging
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jetliners it had parked in the desert after September 11.25 During it’s 2004 bankruptcy filing,
US Air agreed with General Electric Co. to defer lease payments on some aircrafts. The deal
also called for GE Capital Aviation to lease 31 new 70- and 90-seat regional jets to the airline
in the next 3 years and for the airline to return 25 of its larger older aircrafts26.
In Table 4, the dependent variable for equation (1) is the natural log of the maximum
number of years since the aircraft’s first delivery, Log(Age Aircraftjrt).
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While in bankruptcy, the bankrupt carrier employs ‘younger’ planes: the maximum num-
ber of years since the aircraft’s first delivery drops 9 percent percent relative to pre-bankruptcy
(Column 1). The younger fleet remains active even after the carrier emerges from bankruptcy
protection (Column 2). Non-bankrupt competitors cannot freely renege on their aircraft
leases in order to substitute older for younger airplanes and we do not expect to see an im-
provement in aircraft age for these carriers. The results shown are consistent with this. The
age of the aircraft fleet of the bankrupt carrier’s competitors does not significantly change: it
marginally increases by 2 percent while the bankrupt competitor operates under protection
(Column 1) and returns to its pre-bankruptcy level once the carrier emerges from protection
(Column 2).
As with the previous results, we find that excluding year-quarter fixed effects (Columns
3 and 4) significantly biases the results, making the effect of non-bankrupt carriers larger
in magnitude and statistical significance (which would greatly increase the age of their fleet
both during and after the carrier’s bankruptcy).
The results in Columns 5 through 10 are similar in magnitude and in the same direction
as those in Columns 3 and 4, suggesting that including the 2 quarters prior to bankruptcy
(Columns 5 and 6), excluding origin and destination time trends (Columns 7 and 8), and
25See The Wall Street Journal, August 14, 2002.
26See The Washington Post, November 27, 2004.
27Only the 0.03 percent of the observations had an age of zero. To avoid dropping them we added a 1 to
the age and then took the natural logarithm.
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excluding route-carrier fixed effects (Columns 9 and 10) can further confound the effects
of bankruptcy.
The results we present here indicate that while product quality might improve during a
bankruptcy filing, the effects do not persist after the firm emerges from bankruptcy. This is
true measures of quality that result from daily operations of the firm (e.g., delays and cancel-
lations). However, for changes in quality that stem from fixed investments (e.g., investment
in aircrafts), the improvement in quality is persistent.
7 A note on other quality measures
There are other quality measures one can think of concerning airline services: baggage mis-
handled, oversold flights, customer complaints, and frequency of accidents and incidents. We
collected this data.28 Baggage data comes from the Aviation Consumer Protection office
(filed with the Department of Transportation’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics). Bag-
gage statistics are on a monthly (or quarterly) basis, by U.S. carriers that have at least 1
percent of total domestic scheduled-service passenger revenues. Thus, these data are carrier-
year-quarter-month specific, but not market specific. Since the data are not market specific,
we lose an important degree of variation that allows us to precisely estimate the effect of
bankruptcy on mishandled bags.
If we observe that during bankruptcy the number of mishandled bags per enplaned pas-
senger drops, or increases, we cannot disentangle whether this stems from the bankruptcy
filing, or from some year-quarter specific condition that disrupted baggage handling at the
same time that bankruptcy was underway (for example, the shock of September 11).
However, we study these data and find that the mean number of mishandled baggages per
enplaned passenger across carriers, markets, years is 0.0053 for the sample of 611 carrier-year-
28Summary statistics as well as regression analysis using baggage mishandled, oversales, accidents, and
customer complaints is available from the authors upon request.
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quarter observations for which there is a bankrupt carrier operating in the market and 0.0048
for the sample of 433 carrier-year-quarter observations corresponding to the post-bankruptcy
period. The difference in means is not statistically significantly different from zero.
Another measure of airline quality that one might be tempted to use is the number of
oversold seats: measured as the number of passengers who hold confirmed reservations and
are (voluntary or involuntary) denied boarding because the flight is oversold. Again, the
data on this measure are reported quarterly to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, on
a carrier-year-quarter basis. Thus, again, we lose the market dimensionality that allows us
to identify the effect of bankruptcy on over-sales from confounding time specific effects. If
we observe over-sales increase during bankruptcy, we would not be able to identify wether
this is a bankruptcy related effects or an effects related to a time specific boom/depression
in demand booming for exogenous reasons.
Still, we study this data and find that the mean number of total passengers denied boarding
for the set of 212 year-quarter-carrier observations for which no carrier is currently operating
under bankruptcy is 0.0021, while the equivalent statistic for the set of 169 observations
for which there is at least one carrier that operates under court protection, is 0.0015. The
difference of means is statistically and economically insignificantly different from zero.
Customer complaints could also capture quality of service. We collect data on the total
number of customer complaints, filed with the Department of Transportation in writing,
by phone, via E-mail, or in person (it does not include safety complaints), who does not
determine the validity of the complaints. The data are not systematically gathered across
markets, years and carriers. And we therefore consider it too noisy to make any significant
statistical inferences.
Finally, from the National Transportation Safety Board, we collected data on accidents
and incidents by carrier, on a year-quarter-market basis, from 1993 until 2006. We have
detailed data on the causes of accidents and incidents, and on the carrier’s response to these
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events.29 Fortunately, there are too few accidents and incidents per carrier, year-quarter,
and market unit of observation that no significant conclusions can be drawn. For example,
between 1993 and 2006, there are 18 fatal, and 275 non-fatal, accidents across all markets
and across all airlines. Given the large number of markets and flights serving these markets
over this 13 year time window, a total of 293 accidents is statistically negligible. Over the
same sample period, and across all markets and flights, there have been 275 incidents. Again,
a fraction too small relative to the total number of markets and flights to draw significant
inferences.30
8 Conclusions
With the tightening of available credit following the Panic of 2007, several industries have
faced cash constraints that pushed firms into insolvency. This reignited the debate on the
effect that bankruptcy has on different economic agents, one of them being the firm’s con-
sumers. What effect would a firm’s bankruptcy have on the quality of the products that the
bankrupt firm offers?
In this paper we use objective ways to define measures of product quality for airline service:
flight cancellations, flight delays, and aircraft age. We find that delays and cancellations are
less frequent during bankruptcy filings but return to their pre-bankruptcy levels once the
bankrupt firm emerges from Chapter 11. We also find that firms use Chapter 11 filings to
permanently reduce the average age of their fleet. We do not find evidence of statistically
and economically significant changes by the airline’s competitors along any of the dimensions
above. There are other measures of product quality, such as mishandled bags, oversold seats,
29The National Transportation Safety Board defines accidents as an occurrence associated with the operation
of an aircraft where as a result of the operation of an aircraft, any person (either inside or outside the
aircraft) receives fatal or serious injury or any aircraft receives substantial damage. And it defines incidents
as occurrences, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft that affects or could affect
the safety of operations.
30Note that of the total number of 540 accidents and incidents, 9 have been at the airport and airport-related.
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customer complaints, and accident and incident rates, but these are either not market specific,
or there are too few observations to make significant statistical (and economic) inferences.
Our work sheds light on the effect of bankruptcy filings in other industries. For example,
General Motors (GM) recently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Under bankruptcy, GM
shed brands such as Pontiac, Saab, and Saturn. Hence, consumers now have fewer choices.
Yet, it might be that GM will increase the quality of the brands it still produces (e.g., more
reliable and comfortable). Another example: Kmart’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy (January
22, 2002). While restructuring, Kmart closed more than 300 stores in the U.S. and laid off
about 34, 000 workers. At the same time it introduced five prototype stores. These stores
were advertised as having wider aisles, improved selection, and better lighting. Kmart moved
towards fewer stores but better quality ones. Our analysis shows that customers should be
cautious about any effective improvement of product quality: Neither GM nor Kmart are
likely to improve the quality of the products that they continue to produce. However, because
of the downsizing associated with the bankruptcy filing, GM and Kmart might shed their
worse quality products.
This paper also complements the work of Ciliberto and Schenone (2011) who show a re-
duction in the variety of products the bankrupt firm offers while in bankruptcy and after
emerging from bankruptcy. Customers have less options to choose from and hence the dis-
tance from their preferred choice and the actual available options might increase. This shift
in business strategy is detrimental to consumers. Here we show a further dimension along
which customers are not better off during or after a bankruptcy filing: For the products
that the firm continues to offer, quality does not improve, but rather worsens or remains at
pre-bankruptcy levels. The only significant improvement we document is the one stemming
from changes that relate to investments in durable fixed assets.
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Table 1: Stylized facts 
Bankruptcies in the Airline Industry between 1992 and 2007. Airline Bankruptcies are identified from the Air and Transportation Association (ATA), and cross checked with the Bankruptcy Research Database 
from Professor Lynn LoPucki. The remaining information is from news searches in Lexis-Nexus and Factiva. Of course, only a few articles are cited (those closest to the filing date, or the most relevant ones). 
These are just examples that illustrate how carriers downsize taking advantage of the Chapter 11 allowances. And how this, in turn, affects the variety and quality of services offered.  
Airline  Filed Emerged Days  Layoffs Leases Routes 
United 12/9/2002 2/2/2006 1133 
By 12/23/2002, had laid off 646 mechanics due 
to decrease in flight schedule (WSJ, 12/23/2002) 
By May 03 UAL had renegotiated leases on 51 GE 
planes (Bloomberg, 5/24/2003) 
Did not cut routes initially however, did decrease 
flights by 8% and then 4%. (WSJ 4/16/03)  
USAir 8/11/2002 3/31/2003 230 
By 8/22/02, 250 pilots had been laid off, and 
1,070 employees furloughed (SPI, 8/22/02) 
“A U.S. bankruptcy-court judge has given US 
Airways relief from making any further payments 
on 57 aging jetliners it had parked in the desert 
after Sept. 11. All of those are likely to be returned 
to their owners, who will then face the daunting 
task of finding new homes for them.” (WSJ, 
8/14/2002). 
Reduce the daily flight schedule to 1,350 from 
1,550 flights. (WSJ, 8/22/02). Planed to reduce 
mainline jet service 13% by end of 2002 (SPI, 
8/22/02).  Eliminate about 300 weekday flights by 
Nov. 2, but bulk up its schedule on key business 
routes. By September 3, 2002, most changes 
involve fewer frequencies and shifts from big jets 
to smaller planes rather than total elimination of 
service.  Service in 71 cities unchanged, 26 cities 
will have more flight seats. Non-stop flights 
eliminated on about 36 routes. Flights cut at most 
of its hubs (Charlotte, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia 
and Boston Logan), but grow 7% at LaGuardia and 
1% at Reagan Washington National. Flights on 
small regional jets increase 4%, on large jets will 
decrease 13%, and fall by 7% on turboprops. 
(USA, 9/3/2002) 
USAir 9/12/2004 9/27/2005 375 
By October 2004, the bankruptcy court judge in 
October approved a 21 percent pay cut for most 
workers through February (WP, 12/2/2004) 
By November 2004, US Air agreed with General 
Electric Co. to defer lease payments on some 
aircraft and cut engine maintenance cost. The deal 
also calls for GE Capital Aviation to lease 31 new 70- 
and 90-seat regional jets to the airline in the next 3 
years and for the airline to return 25 of its larger 
aircraft. (WP, 11/27/2004). US Airways agreed to 
return 10 Airbus A319s by 2005, and 15 older 
Boeing 737s to GE in 2006 and 2007, (WSJ, 
11/26/2004). Starting May 2005, ground and return 




Table 1 (Cont): Stylized facts  
 
Airline  Filed Emerged Days  Layoffs Leases Routes 
Northwest  9/14/2005 5/18/2007 611 
Lay off 1,400 flight attendants by the end 
of 2005 (WSJ, 9/21/05). By 10/31/05, 900 
furloughs, including 480 in Detroit and 
355 in Minneapolis, two large NW hubs. 
By 9/21/2005, 500 pilots were laid off 
given the plan to reduce the number of 
hours its mainline fleet operates by 13% 
(WSJ, 9/21/2005). By 10/13/2005, 4,400 
machinists and related employees where 
replaced by "cheaper workers and 
outside vendors" (NYT 10/13/2005) 
13 planes in a fleet of 433 aircrafts returned to 
lessor, and many more aircrafts have the 
potential to be rejected. By 9/26/2006, all 35 jet 
leases with Mesaba terminated (WSJ, 
9/26/2005). On 2/1/2006, the bankruptcy judge 
allowed NW request to lower lease and loan 
payment for aircrafts (WSJ, 2/1/06) 
In filing, NW announced cut in domestic 
mainline capacity by 9 to 10% (and 
international by 4 to 5%) (NYT 10/13/05). By 
fourth quarter 2005, mainline capacity was 
down 7 to 8% from previous year.  
Delta 9/14/2005 4/25/2007 563 
By 9/23/2005, announced plans to cut 
9,000 jobs (USA, 9/23/05) 
By 1/26/06, DL had cancelled the lease on the 
north-side hangar in its primary hub, Hartsfield 
Jackson airport. (AJC, 1/26/06) 
In filing, DL pans to reconfigure its fleet and 
network, retiring 4 of 11 aircraft types, 
purpose of such restructuring involves 
shrinking capacity. By 9/23/2005, announced a 
reduction in domestic flights of 20% by 
downsizing hubs Atlanta, Cincinnati, and Salt 
Lake City. (USA, 9/23/05) 
ATA 
Airlines 
10/26/2004 2/28/2006 490 
By July 05, ATA cut 450 workers (300 
mechanics and 100 reservations 
personnel) (WSJ, 7/18/2005) 
Upon filing, ATA reached a deal to give over its 
gate leases, slots and routes out of Chicago's 
Midway airport, New York's LaGuardia, and 
Washington National airports (WSJ 10/26/04). 
ATA Holdings Corp.'s ATA Airlines gave GE the 
chance to take back 18 planes that deployed in 
places such as China, Brazil and India. (WSJ, 
3/31/2005) 
ATA cut its Chicago fleet to 50 aircraft from 60 
(DOW, 12/16/05). “ATA Airlines, once the 
busiest carrier in Indianapolis but shrinking 
during bankruptcy proceedings in the last year, 
said yesterday that it would cancel its last 
three daily flights out of the city, which is its 
headquarters, as of Jan. 10” NYT, 11/2/2005) 
Key to the Sources: NYT = New York Times; WSJ = Wall Street Journal; AJC= Atlanta Journal Constitution; SPI = Seattle Post-Intelligencer; USA = USA Today. 
 
  
Table 2: Data Description 
Data On Time Performance Scheduling Data Aircraft Characteristics 
Frequency By carrier, year, quarter (since 1993) By carrier, year, quarter (since 1993) For the make and model reported in the 
scheduling data 
Market Specific? Yes Yes No 
Data Collected On-time departure and arrival.  
 
Aircraft configuration 
Aircraft group (prop, turbo prop, 2, 3, 4, or 6 
engines) 
Aircraft type (make and model). 
Year first ordered, year first flown, first 
and last delivery year. 
 
Source The "On-Time Performance" schedule 
gathered by the Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics (BTS) 
The T-100 Domestic Segment of Form 41 
reported by the BTS 
Each aircraft producer’s website. 
Complemented with data from 
airliners.net, and data from "The 
International Directory of Civil Aircraft" 
Database Monthly data reported by US certified air carriers that account for at least one percent of 
domestic scheduled passenger revenues. 
"The International Directory of Civil 
Aircraft" contains detailed information on 
each aircrafts characteristics and history. 
  
Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Market Competition Variables 
 Mean S.D. 
Delays 
Number of Departed Flights that were 
more than 15 Minutes Late in a quarter 
 
58.077          56.038 
Cancelled Flights  
Number of Scheduled Flights that were 
canceled in a quarter 
 
8.377        17.404 
Age Aircraft 
Number of years since year of first delivery 
of the plane 
20.465     8.343 
   
Scheduled Flights 
 
337.474     292.035 
Departed Flights 292.355     260.30 




Table 4: The Effect of Bankruptcy Filings on Delays 
The dependent variable is natural logarithm of the total number of times that carrier j, flying in route r, during the year quarter t, arrived at the destination at least 15 minutes late. Arrival 
delays are the difference between scheduled and actual arrival times. Actual arrival time is defined as “The time the aircraft touches down upon arrival”; and Scheduled arrival is defined 
as “The scheduled time that an aircraft should cross a certain point (landing or metering fix).”  Arrival delays do not include taxi in times.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 During After During After During After During After During After 
           
Effect on Bankrupt Firm -0.09*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.21*** 0.03*** 0.21*** 0.05*** 0.21*** 0.05*** 0.22*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Effect on Rivals 0.01 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.24*** 0.07*** 0.20*** 0.07*** 0.21*** 0.08*** 0.20*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Departed Flights 1.04*** 1.09*** 1.09*** 1.09*** 1.07*** 
 (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -1.78*** -2.44*** -2.39*** -2.36*** -2.24*** 
 (0.16) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
Observations 139,424 139,424 139,424 145,246 145,246 
Route-carriers 6,114 6,114 6,114 6,127 6,127 
Fixed/Random Effects FE FE FE FE RE 
Exclude 2 Quarters Yes Yes Yes No No 
Time trends Yes Yes No No No 
Year-quarter FE Yes No No No No 
Adj. R-squared 0.84 0.80 0.80 0.79  
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 5: The Effect of Bankruptcy Filings on Cancelled Flights 
 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the total number of times that carrier j, cancelled a flight in route r, during the year quarter t. A flight is considered cancelled by the BTS 
when it is listed in a carrier's computer reservation system during the seven calendar days prior to its scheduled departure but the flight was not operated and did not depart. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 During After During After During After During After During After During After 
             
Effect on Bankrupt Firm -0.08*** 0.03** -0.16*** -0.08*** -0.26*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.17*** -0.20*** -0.16*** -0.20*** -0.16*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Effect on Rivals -0.04*** 0.02 -0.13*** -0.03** -0.21*** -0.14*** -0.18*** -0.11*** -0.19*** -0.13*** -0.19*** -0.13*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Scheduled Flights 0.89*** 0.93*** 0.95*** 0.94*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -3.35*** -3.69*** -3.84*** -3.84*** -3.60*** -3.60*** 
 (0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Observations 143,267 143,267 143,267 149,229 149,229 149,229 
Route-Carriers 6,286 6,286 6,286 6,302 6,302 
 
6,302 
Random Effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Fixed/Random Effects FE FE FE FE RE RE 
Exclude 2 Quarters Yes Yes Yes No No No 
 Time trends Yes Yes No No No No 
Year-quarter FE Yes No No No No No 
Tobit (Left Censoring at 0) No No No No No Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.71 0.63 0.62 0.62   
Log Likelihood       -172435.28 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
Table 6: The Effect of Bankruptcy Filings on the Age of Planes 
 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the aircraft’s (make and model) first delivery:  Data on the year a specific aircraft type (make and model) was 
first delivered by the aircraft’s producer is from Aircraft producer's website, airliners.net, "The International Directory of Civil Aircraft."  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 During After 
 
During After During After During After During After 
Effect on Bankrupt Firm -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.01 -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.05*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Effect on Rivals 0.02*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.09*** 0.03*** 0.09*** 0.03*** 0.09*** 0.02*** 0.08*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Constant 3.69*** 2.90*** 2.91*** 2.91*** 2.80*** 
 (0.17) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Observations 175,692 175,692 175,692 175,692 175,692 
Route-carriers 8,604 
 
8,604 8,604 8,604 8,604 
Fixed/Random Effects FE FE FE FE RE 
Exclude 2 Quarters Yes Yes Yes No No 
Time trends Yes Yes No No No 
Year-quarter FE Yes No No No No 
Adj.  R-squared 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.69  
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
